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WHAT IS THE GIST OF THE MAIL FRAUD
STATUTE?
C.J. WILLIAMS*
Under jurisprudence interpreting the mail fraud statute, it is an accepted
truism that each separate mailing made in connection with a “scheme or
artifice to defraud” constitutes a separate offense.1 This truism arose from
the mail fraud statute’s unique past.2 In enacting the original mail fraud
statute in 1872, Congress aimed to punish those who misused a government
agency, namely the United States Post Office, in the process of executing a
fraudulent scheme.3 Congressional authority to enact legislation on matters
affecting the United States mail was the basis for federal jurisdiction to
make mail fraud a federal criminal offense.4 It was the intentional abuse of
the United States mail to carry out a fraud, therefore, and not the underlying
fraud, that was the essence or gist of the mail fraud statute.5 Because it was
* Adjunct Professor of Law, University of Iowa College of Law; Assistant United
States Attorney, United States Attorney’s Office, Northern District of Iowa. This Article
was written by the author acting in his private capacity and not as an employee of the United
States government. All statements made herein reflect only the author’s own views and
opinions and not those of the United States of America or the United States Department of
Justice.
1. See, e.g., United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995) (“[It is] not the
general plan or scheme that is punished but rather each individual use of the mails in
furtherance of that scheme.”); United States v. Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir.
1995) (finding that each separate mailing constitutes a separate mail fraud offense); United
States v. McClelland, 868 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v. Vaughn,
797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 444 (6th
Cir. 1984) (same, and citing other cases for same proposition); United States v. Ledesma,
632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 1980) (same).
2. See infra text accompanying notes 35-43.
3. See infra text accompanying notes 35-37.
4. Specifically, the power of Congress to enact the original mail fraud statute derived
from the postal power, found in Article I, Section 8, Clause 7 of the United States
Constitution, which provides Congress authority “[t]o establish Post Offices and post
Roads.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 7.
5. See, e.g., Mitchell v. United States, 142 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1944) (“But the
gist and crux of the offense is the use of the mails in the execution of the scheme . . . .”);
United States v. Horman, 118 F. 780, 780 (S.D. Ohio 1901) (“[T]he policy of this statute is
to prevent the misuse of the mails of the United States, -- the prostitution of the mails of the
United States in furtherance of dishonest schemes.”), aff’d, 116 F. 350 (6th Cir. 1902);
United States v. Loring, 91 F. 881, 885 (N.D. Ill. 1884) (“The gist of this offense does not
consist in the fraudulent scheme alone, but in using the post-office establishment of the
United States for the purpose of executing a fraud.”); United States v. Jones, 10 F. 469, 470
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the misuse of the United States mail, and not the creation of a fraud scheme,
that was the essence of the original mail fraud statute, it logically followed
that each separate use of the United States mails for the purpose of carrying
out a scheme to defraud others constituted a separate violation of the mail
fraud statute.
Nearly a century and a half has elapsed since the enactment of the
original mail fraud statute in 1872.6 During this time, Congress has
repeatedly recast the statute’s language, significantly altering the focus and
essence of the mail fraud statute.7 Indeed, use of the United States mail is
no longer even necessary to violate the mail fraud statute because Congress
amended the statute in 1994 to make it equally offensive to use a private or
commercial interstate carrier to execute a fraudulent scheme.8 Congress
relied on their Commerce Clause powers to expand the mail fraud statute
beyond the United States mails and capture private carriers.9 Thus, this
change eliminated the mail fraud statute’s reliance and focus on the misuse
of the United States mails. Because of this transformation, the current mail
fraud statute bears only a vague resemblance to its ancestor.10
Courts have further broadened the scope and shifted the direction of the
statute by interpreting the statute to encompass essentially any fraudulent
scheme in which some mailing occurs.11 Thus, the use of the United States
mail or a commercial mail carrier gives rise to federal criminal jurisdiction
even when the mailing is tangentially related to the offense.12 Furthermore,
the statute gives rise to federal jurisdiction even when the defendant had no
intention of using the mails to execute the fraudulent scheme.13 For all
intents and purposes, the mail fraud statute today is a general federal fraud
statute. As a result, today the statute is applied to cases that never could
have been brought under the original mail fraud statute.14 The evolution of
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1882) (“But the gist of the offence [sic] consists in the abuse of the mail. The
corpus delicti was the mailing of the letter in execution of the unlawful scheme.”).
6. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507.
7. See infra text accompanying notes 46-49, 54-59, 67-68, 79-82.
8. See infra text accompanying notes 88-92.
9. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3 (“To regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and
among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes”).
10. This is revealed most clearly by a direct comparison of the original mail fraud
statute against the current statute, available in Appendix A.
11. See infra text accompanying notes 50-53, 60-75, 83-92.
12. See infra text accompanying notes 88-90, 92.
13. See infra text accompanying note 91.
14. See Brian C. Behrens, Comment, 18 U.S.C. § 1341 and § 1346: Deciphering the
Confusing Letters of the Mail Fraud Statute, 13 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 489, 489 (1993)
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the statute from a minor, narrowly tailored act to its current broad wording
and expansive judicial interpretation has indeed made it the “true love” of
federal prosecutors.15
As a result of these changes, abuse of the United States mails no longer
forms the core of the crime. Rather, the “scheme or artifice to defraud”
element has appropriately evolved to become the central focus and true
“gist” of the mail fraud statute.16 The use of the United States mail, or some
other common carrier engaged in interstate commerce, has become
relegated to a jurisdictional element of the crime.17
Nevertheless, courts have continued to parrot language from decisions
issued more than a century ago by courts interpreting the original mail fraud
statute that relied upon the postal power as a basis for federal jurisdiction.18
Only the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized that the true gist of
today’s mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud and not the use of the
mails.19 Consequently, we are left with the illogical result that each mailing
is treated as a separate offense, even though the number of mailings seldom
bears a logical relationship to the nature or scope of the underlying
fraudulent scheme and is often a matter of pure happenstance.20
(“[T]he mail fraud statute has developed so dramatically over its history that the statute’s
original drafters would be somewhat astonished to see the situations in which it is applied
today.”).
15. Federal prosecutors are not known for waxing poetic, but the mail fraud statute
compels compassion.
To federal prosecutors of white collar crime, the mail fraud statute is our
Stradivarius, our Colt 45, our Louisville Slugger, our Cuisinart -- and our true
love. We may flirt with RICO, show off with 10b-5, and call the conspiracy
law ‘darling,’ but we always come home to the virtues of 18 U.S.C. § 1341,
with its simplicity, adaptability, and comfortable familiarity.
Jed S. Rakoff, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute (Part I), 18 DUQ. L. REV. 771, 771 (1980).
16. See infra notes 46-102 and accompanying text.
17. See infra notes 83-92 and accompanying text.
18. See, e.g., Parr v. United States, 363 U.S. 370, 389 (1960) (finding the purpose of the
mail fraud statute is to protect the United States mails); United States v. Lovett, 811 F.2d
979, 983 (7th Cir. 1987) (“The objective of the mail fraud statute is to safeguard the United
States Postal Service[] . . . .”); United States v. Lennon, 751 F.2d 737, 741 (5th Cir. 1985)
(establishing that the mail fraud statute was designed to protect United States mails from
abuse).
19. United States v. Dunning, 929 F.2d 579, 581 (10th Cir. 1991) (“[T]he gist of [the
mail fraud statute] is devising a scheme to defraud with a purpose of executing the
scheme . . . .”); United States v. Kelley, 929 F.2d. 582, 585 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that the
gist of the mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud).
20. See Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Arnett, 875 F.2d 1271, 1278 (7th Cir. 1989) (dictum)
(stating that, because each mailing or use of wires constitutes a separate offense, “the
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Not only is this result irrational, it lends support to allegations of due
process and double jeopardy violations.21 Further, and perhaps more
importantly, the continued focus on a mailing as the unit of prosecution
results in applications of the statute that are both over- and underinclusive.22
When each mailing is deemed a separate offense, the statute could be
applied to mailings quite unrelated to the offense. At the same time,
making the mailing the unit of prosecution upon which the statute of
limitations hinges can exclude from prosecution schemes to defraud which
continue beyond a five-year period after the last mailing. 23
The time has come to recognize the need to change the focus of the mail
fraud statute from the use of the mail to the scheme to defraud. To illustrate
this, Part I of this article shows that the mail fraud statute, as originally
enacted by Congress, was based on the Postal Power Clause and focused on
the abuse of the mail system to commit fraud, but it has since been
substantially amended such that the use of the mails is just one basis for
federal jurisdiction. Part II shows how courts illogically adopted the same
unit of prosecution analysis for the wire fraud statute, even though its
jurisdiction was based on the Commerce Clause. Part III relates that, in
contrast, courts have adopted a different unit of prosecution for other
criminal statutes even though they were modeled on the mail fraud statute.
Finally, Part IV argues that a slight change in the statutory language can
make clear what is obvious—the gist of the mail fraud statute is the scheme
to defraud.

number of offenses is only tangentially related to the underlying fraud, and can be a matter
of happenstance.”).
21. Id. See also infra Part IV.
22. The “unit of prosecution” for a criminal statute is that “aspect of criminal activity
that the statute aims to punish.” Courtney J. Linn, Redefining the Bank Secrecy Act:
Currency Reporting and the Crime of Structuring, 50 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 407, 471
(2010). In other words, a unit of prosecution is an act for which a new charge can be lodged
against the defendant. See United States v. Taylor, 13 F.3d 986, 994 (6th Cir. 1994).
23. For purposes of the mail fraud statute, the statute of limitations begins to run as of
the date of the last mailing in furtherance of the scheme to defraud. See, e.g., United States
v. Crossley, 224 F.3d 847, 859 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v. Barger, 178 F.3d 844, 847
(7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Pemberton, 121 F.3d 1157, 1163 (8th Cir. 1997); United
States v. Eisen, 974 F.2d 246, 263 (2d Cir. 1992).
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I. Evolution of the Mail Fraud Statute
The mail fraud statute has a unique, unusual, and convoluted history.24
The statute, one of the broadest of all federal criminal statutes, had a
modest origin. In the aftermath of the Civil War and during the tumultuous
Reconstruction era, Congress first began to enact criminal legislation to
protect the integrity of the United States Post Office. In 1865, Congress
revised the postal laws25 by prohibiting the mailing of obscene and other
inappropriate material.26 Shortly thereafter, Congress made it a federal
offense to use the United States Postal Service to promote lotteries.27 These
were narrowly tailored statutes with little lasting influence on the scope of
federal criminal law.28 But they were the progenitors of the modern mail
fraud statute, which, in contrast, has had a broader influence on federal
criminal law.
A. The Original Mail Fraud Statute and Its Early Interpretation
Congress enacted the mail fraud statute29 in 1872 primarily to address the
sale of counterfeit currency through the United States Mail.30 The statutory
24. For an excellent, detailed history of the evolution of the mail fraud statute and
judicial interpretation of the mail fraud statute through the 1970s, see generally Rakoff,
supra note 15. See also John C. Coffee, Jr., The Metastasis of Mail Fraud: The Continuing
Story of the “Evolution” of a White-Collar Crime, 21 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1 (1983).
25. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, § 16, 13 Stat. 504, 507.
26. See also DOROTHY GANFIELD FOWLER, UNMAILABLE: CONGRESS AND THE POST
OFFICE 57 (1977) (citing CONG. GLOBE, 38TH CONG., 2D SESS. 661-62, 965-66, 1256-57,
1311, 1391 (1865)).
27. Act of July 27, 1868, ch. 246, § 13, 15 Stat. 194, 196. This statute made it a federal
offense to use the United States Postal Service to send circulars or letters “concerning
[illegal] lotteries, so called gift concerts, or other similar enterprises offering prizes of any
kind on any pretext whatsoever.” Id.
28. See Jason T. Elder, Comment, Federal Mail Fraud Unleashed: Revisiting the
Criminal Catch-All, 77 OR. L. REV. 707, 709-10 (1998) (recounting early statutes addressing
the abuse of the mails for the purpose of sending obscene materials and promoting lotteries,
concluding the “limited legislation achieved little success,” and noting that Congress
responded by enacting the mail fraud statute).
29. Act of June 8, 1872, ch. 335, § 149, 17 Stat. 283, 302.
30. See McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 356 (1987) (“The sponsor of the
recodification stated, in apparent reference to the antifraud provision, that measures were
needed ‘to prevent the frauds which are mostly gotten up in the large cities . . . by thieves,
forgers, and rapscallions generally, for the purpose of deceiving and fleecing the innocent
people in the country.’”) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 41ST CONG., 3D SESS. 35 (1870) (remarks
of Rep. Farnsworth)); see also Geraldine Szott Moohr, Mail Fraud and the Intangible Rights
Doctrine: Someone to Watch Over Us, 31 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 153, 158 (1994) (stating that
the statute was designed to redress schemes for selling counterfeit currency through mail).
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language was clearly broader than simply prohibiting the use of the mails
for counterfeiting, however, making it a federal offense to use the mails in
the execution of any “scheme or artifice to defraud.”31 Courts looked to the
title of the statute, “Penalty for Misusing the Post-Office Establishment,”
and to the mail-emphasizing language in the statute,32 in concluding that
Congress intended the mail fraud statute to protect the United States mail
from criminals’ use and abuse.33 Thus, courts found the original mail fraud
statute had three elements:
(1) . . . [T]he persons charged must have devised a scheme or
artifice to defraud[;]
(2) . . . [T]hey must have intended to effect this scheme by
opening or intending to open correspondence with some other
persons through the post office establishment, or by inciting such
other person to open communication with them[; and]
(3) . . . [I]n carrying out such scheme, such person must have
either deposited a letter or packet in the post office, or taken or
received one therefrom.34
The essence of the mail fraud statute, then, was “not so much on the
degree of the fraud as on the degree of misuse of the mails.”35 Thus, courts
required a showing that the defendant intended to use the mails to execute
the fraudulent scheme.36 Moreover, the statutory language restricted the
number of counts that could be charged, limiting it to three counts for a six-

31. Act of June 8, 1872 § 301.
32. Id.
The mail-emphasizing language included “misusing the post office
establishment” and “proportion the punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse
of the post-office establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme . . . .”
Id.
33. See supra note 5; see also Rakoff, supra note 15, at 783; Moohr, supra note 30, at
159.
34. Stokes v. United States, 157 U.S. 187, 188-89 (1895); see also United States v.
Young, 232 U.S. 155, 159 (1914).
35. Rakoff, supra note 15, at 784.
36. See, e.g., Stokes, 157 U.S. at 188 (listing as an element the intent to use the mails to
effectuate the scheme to defraud); Farmer v. United States, 223 F. 903, 907 (2d Cir. 1915)
(reversing conviction where there was insufficient evidence to prove the defendant intended
to use the mails to effectuate the fraudulent scheme); Tyner v. United States, 23 App. D.C.
324, 341 (1904) (finding indictment defective for failing to allege defendant intended to use
the mails).
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month period, regardless of the number of mailings that occurred.37 By
doing so, it explicitly established each mailing as a separate unit of
prosecution. Thus, with the language of the original mail fraud statute,
Congress could not have been clearer that it intended to criminalize abuse
of the United States mail in the process of executing a scheme to defraud,
and not to criminalize fraudulent schemes in which the United States mail
happened to be involved.
The Supreme Court did not confront the mail fraud statute until fifteen
years after its enactment. In Ex parte Henry,38 the Court addressed the
narrow issue of the number of permissible charges under the statute. The
defendant had been indicted two times, each indictment charging him with
mail fraud counts for six mailings, all of which occurred in the same sixmonth period.39 The unique language of the original mail fraud statute
permitted only three charges for any fraud scheme that occurred in a sixmonth period.40 The question, then, was whether the government could
bypass this limitation by bringing multiple indictments.41 In answering this
question in the affirmative, the Court made clear that it was not attempting
to rule on the broader issue of the statute’s scope or purpose.42
Nevertheless, although in dicta, the Court approved the district court’s
finding that “[e]ach letter so taken out or put in constitutes a separate and
distinct violation of the act.”43
In the century following Ex parte Henry, courts repeatedly held that each
separate mailing constituted a separate offense.44 If one delves into the
37. See Act of June 8, 1872 § 301 (“The indictment, information, or complaint may
severally charge offences [sic] to the number of three when committed within the same six
calendar months; but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence . . . .”). Arguably, one
could surmise from this limitation that Congress realized the potential for prosecutors to
abuse the statute by bringing one charge for each mailing regardless of the relation between
the number of mailings and the scope of the fraudulent scheme. This theory would explain
why Congress created an arbitrary limitation of three charges: to prevent such abuse.
Unfortunately, there is no legislative history that sheds any light on the intent of this strange
penalty section.
38. 123 U.S. 372 (1887).
39. Id. at 373-74.
40. The pertinent language was: “The indictment, information, or complaint may
severally charge offences [sic] to the number of three when committed within the same six
calendar months.” Act of June 8, 1872 § 301.
41. Henry, 123 U.S. at 374.
42. Id. at 374-75.
43. Id. at 374 (quoting the district court opinion).
44. Every circuit court of appeal has held each mailing constitutes a separate offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Alston, 609 F.2d 531, 535-36 (D.C. Cir. 1979); United States v.
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authority upon which courts relied in reaching this holding, one can
ultimately trace the authority back to Ex parte Henry (that is, when they cite
authority for the proposition).45 In other words, when courts cite authority
for the proposition that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, that
authority ultimately relies on the Supreme Court’s holding in Ex parte
Henry, which, of course, interpreted the very different original mail fraud
statute. Thus, courts have misinterpreted the current version of the mail
fraud and wire fraud statutes by relying on authority interpreting an old and
very different version of the mail fraud statute. In reality, in the 120 years
since Ex parte Henry, both the statutory language of the mail fraud statute,
and judicial interpretation of the statute, have changed significantly.
B. Early Amendments to the Mail Fraud Statute
Congress first altered the mail fraud statute in 1889 by expressly
including specific counterfeiting and swindling schemes under the
definition of a “scheme or artifice to defraud.”46 For example, Congress
included such schemes as those involving “counterfeit or spurious coin,
bank notes, [or] paper money,” schemes “commonly called the ‘sawdust
swindle,’” and schemes “dealing or pretending to deal in what is commonly
Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993); United States v. Eskow, 422 F.2d 1060, 1064 (2d Cir.
1970); Francis v. United States, 152 F. 155, 155 (3d Cir. 1907); United States v. Bakker, 925
F.2d 728, 739 (4th Cir. 1991); United States v. Shaid, 730 F.2d 225, 230 (5th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439, 444-45 (6th Cir. 1984); United States v. Joyce, 499
F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 914 (8th Cir. 1975);
United States v. Vaughn, 797 F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986); Marvin v. United States, 279
F.2d 451, 453 n.3 (10th Cir. 1960); United States v. Edmondson, 818 F.2d 768, 769 (11th
Cir. 1987).
45. In United States v. Gardner, 65 F.3d 82, 85 (8th Cir. 1995), the court cited directly
to Ex parte Henry for authority. In Kennedy, 64 F.3d 1465, 1476 (10th Cir. 1995), the court
cited Palmer v. United States, 229 F.2d 861, 867 (10th Cir. 1955), which in turn cited
Badders v. United States, 240 U.S. 391, 394 (1916), which in turn cited Ex parte Henry. In
McClelland, 868 F.2d 704, 706 (5th Cir. 1989), the court cited no authority. In Vaughn, 797
F.2d 1485, 1493 (9th Cir. 1986), the court cited United States v. Weatherspoon, 581 F.2d
595, 602 (7th Cir. 1978), and United States v. Jones, 712 F.2d 1316, 1320 (9th Cir. 1983).
Weatherspoon in turn cited United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 18 (7th Cir. 1974), which in
turn relied upon Badders, which in turn cited Ex parte Henry. Jones, on the other hand,
while it involved a prosecution using several mail fraud counts under a single scheme to
defraud, does not support Vaughn in that the Jones court does not specifically state that each
mailing constitutes a separate offense. In Stull, 743 F.2d at 444, the court relied upon
Badders for its authority that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, which, of course,
cited Ex parte Henry for authority. Finally, in Ledesma, 632 F.2d 670, 679 (7th Cir. 1980),
the court similarly cited Badders, which finds its authority in Ex parte Henry.
46. Act of Mar. 2, 1889, ch. 393, § 1, 25 Stat. 873, 873.
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called ‘green articles,’ ‘green coin,’ ‘bills,’ ‘paper goods,’ ‘spurious
treasury notes,’ ‘United States goods,’ [or] ‘green cigars,’” among other
things.47 The legislative history fails to reveal any explanation of
Congress’s intent in amending the statute.48
Consequently, courts
interpreted the changes to either expand or narrow the scope of the statute
depending on the particular court’s predisposition.49
The only decision of any lasting importance interpreting the 1889
version of the mail fraud statute was Durland v. United States.50 In
Durland, the Supreme Court adopted a broad construction of the mail fraud
statute, loosening the statute from its moorings to the abuse of the United
States mail as the focus of the statute.51 In the midst of a national
depression, caused in part by fraud and unbridled speculation in stocks and
bonds, the Court was asked to determine whether the mail fraud statute
reached a scheme to issue bonds to investors with no intention of ever
returning the money to the investors.52 In concluding that the mail fraud
statute departed from common law and reached misrepresentations of future
facts, the Court stated that “beyond the letter of the statute is the evil sought
to be remedied.”53
A decade after the Supreme Court sanctioned a broad interpretation of
the mail fraud statute in Durland, Congress again amended the statute,
significantly shifting its focus even further toward the “scheme and artifice
to defraud” element and away from the mailing element.54 This 1909
amendment eliminated the mail-emphasizing language from the statute,
including the language describing the prohibited conduct as “misusing the
Post-Office establishment” and the language limiting the number of counts
during a sixth-month period.55 The amendment further struck from the
47. Id.
48. This is a part of a pattern of omission maintained by Congress to this day when
amending the mail fraud statute.
49. Rakoff, supra note 15, at 809-11 (reviewing decisions adopting various
interpretations of the amended mail fraud statute).
50. 161 U.S. 306 (1896).
51. Id. at 310-15.
52. Id. at 310.
53. Id. at 313. At the time of the Durland decision, the Court had not yet dismissed the
mailing element to only jurisdictional status. While it agreed “the indictment would [have
been] more satisfactory” had it focused more on the actual mailings, it held that it was still
sufficient and the defendant could have filed a motion for a bill of particulars anyway. Id. at
315.
54. Act of Mar. 4, 1909, Pub. L. No. 60-350, ch. 321, § 215, 35 Stat. 1088, 1130.
55. Id.

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

296

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:287

original mail fraud statute language requiring proof the defendant “open[ed]
or intend[ed] to open correspondence or communication with any
person . . . by means of the Post-Office Establishment.”56 Instead, it
inserted language providing that a person could commit mail fraud if it
“caused” the mails to be used.57 Thus, the amendment eliminated the
second essential element, the element requiring the defendant intended to
use the mails to carry out the fraudulent scheme.58 It was this element that
made central to the offense abuse of the United States mail. Consequently,
since 1909 the mailing element has no longer been the gist of the mail fraud
offense, instead it has merely functioned to establish federal jurisdiction.59
Five years after the 1909 amendment to the mail fraud statute, a
unanimous Supreme Court approved the amended statute’s broadened
scope. In United States v. Young,60 the Court rejected a narrow
interpretation of the statute, finding that after the 1909 amendment, the
elements of the mail fraud statute had become:
. . . (a) a scheme devised or intended to be devised to defraud,
or for obtaining money or property by means of false pretenses,
and,
(b) for the purpose of executing such scheme or attempting to
do so, the placing of any letter in any post office of the United
States to be sent or delivered by the Post Office Establishment.61
The Court thereby clarified that the mailing element served a purely
jurisdictional function.62 Nevertheless, though the effect of its holding was
just the opposite, in dicta the Court parroted the worn-out phrase that “[t]he
gist of the offense is the use of the United States mails in the execution of
the scheme, or in attempting to do so.”63
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. An annotated version of the statute, available in Appendix B, exposes the alterations
more readily.
59. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 816-17 (“[I]t no longer made sense to say that the
statute aimed to deter the abuse of the mail system, because the defendant no longer had to
intend any use of the mails whatsoever; the minimal use of the mails that would trigger the
statute could, within broad limits, be an incidental or even accidental accompaniment of the
defendant’s fraudulent scheme.”).
60. 232 U.S. 155 (1914).
61. Id. at 161.
62. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 817 (stating that the Young Court construed the
mailing requirement as a “jurisdictional element”).
63. Young, 232 U.S. at 159.
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The Supreme Court soon compounded the confusion over the focus of
the mail fraud statute by its statements in the Badders v. United States
case.64 In Badders, the Supreme Court unanimously rejected a vagueness
challenge to the 1909 version of the mail fraud statute.65 In dicta again,
however, the Court cited Ex parte Henry, which relied on the unamended
statute, for the proposition that “there is no doubt that the law may make
each putting of a letter into the postoffice [sic] a separate offence [sic].”66
Although it is true the law may make each mailing a separate offense, the
Court failed to note that the 1909 amendment eliminated the mailemphasizing language such that the mail fraud statute no longer made each
mailing a separate offense.
After 1909, Congress made no further substantive changes to the
language of the mail fraud statute until 1987. During this nearly eightyyear period, the lower courts expanded the scope of the mail fraud statute,
building on the broad interpretation the Supreme Court sanctioned in
Young.67 At the end of this period, nearly any fraudulent scheme in which
the United States mail was somehow involved now fell within the reach of
the mail fraud statute, so long as the use of the mail “[could] reasonably be
foreseen.”68
Although initially the mail fraud statute was applied only to schemes to
deprive citizens of money or property, in the 1940s, courts began allowing
an expansion of the mail fraud statute’s scope by including within the
“scheme or artifice to defraud” element the concept of intangible rights.69 It
was not until the 1970s, however, that prosecutors utilized the intangible
rights concept on a regular basis, primarily to prosecute public corruption at

64. 240 U.S. 391 (1916).
65. Id. at 393.
66. Id. at 394.
67. See Moohr, supra note 30, at 159; see also Roger J. Miner, Federal Courts, Federal
Crimes, and Federalism, 10 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 117, 121 (1987) (stating that judicial
decisions have turned the mail fraud statute “into a vehicle for the prosecution of an almost
unlimited number of offenses bearing very little connection to the mails”).
68. Pereira v. United States, 347 U.S. 1, 9 (1954).
69. See, e.g., Shushan v. United States, 117 F.2d 110, 115 (5th Cir. 1942) (expanding
scope of statute to include any scheme by corruption of public officials), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Cruz, 478 F.2d 408 (5th Cir. 1973); United States v. Classic, 35
F. Supp. 457, 458 (E.D. La. 1940) (using intangible rights concept to bring election
commission’s scheme to defraud within scope of mail fraud statute); see also Michael R.
Dreeben, Insider Trading and Intangible Rights: Redefinition of the Mail Fraud Statute, 26
AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181, 185-87 (1988) (discussing the development of the intangible rights
doctrine).
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the state and local levels.70 The courts approved the expansion by
interpreting the “scheme or artifice to defraud” element to encompass not
just property, but also the intangible right of honest services.71 In time, the
intangible rights doctrine was extended to cover not only public fiduciary
duties, but private fiduciary duties as well.72 By 1987, all federal courts of
appeal had accepted an expansive interpretation of the statute and
sanctioned the intangible rights doctrine,73 though not without some
criticism of the danger posed by the expanded scope of the mail fraud
statute.74 The courts continued, however, to cite earlier cases citing the
unamended statute that held the mailing element was the gist of the mail
fraud offense.75
C. McNally, Congress’s Response, and Schmuck
In 1987, the Supreme Court attempted to narrow the scope of the mail
fraud statute, at least with regard to the intangible rights doctrine. In
70. See Dreeben, supra note 69, at 185 (“The intangible rights doctrine was developed
primarily to prosecute corrupt political officials who furthered their personal or financial
interests at the expense of their obligation to act in the interest of the public.”). One of the
early influential cases establishing the intangible rights doctrine was United States v. States,
488 F.2d 761, 765 (8th Cir. 1973), in which the court held that the mail fraud statute covered
a scheme to defraud citizens of “intangible political and civil rights” through election fraud.
See Peter M. Oxman, Note, The Federal Mail Fraud Statute After McNally v. United States,
107 S. Ct. 2875 (1987): The Remains of the Intangible Rights Doctrine and Its Proposed
Congressional Restoration, 25 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 743, 749 (1988) (reviewing the history of
the doctrine and the influential role played by the States case).
71. See, e.g., United States v. Bronston, 658 F.2d 920, 926 (2d Cir. 1981); United States
v. George, 477 F.2d 508, 512 (7th Cir. 1973).
72. See, e.g., Bronston, 658 F.2d at 922 (finding a lawyer guilty of mail fraud for
secretly representing client whose interests were adverse to other firm clients); George, 477
F.2d at 510 (finding purchasing agent of private company guilty of mail fraud for accepting
kickbacks from supplier).
73. See United Sates v. Berg, 710 F. Supp. 438, 441 n.3 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (containing a
list of circuit court cases approving of intangible rights doctrine), rev’d on other grounds sub
nom. United States v. Schwartz, 924 F.2d 410 (2d Cir. 1991).
74. See United States v. Margiotta, 688 F.2d 108, 140 n.3 (2d Cir. 1982) (Winter, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (listing cases critical of expansion of mail fraud
statute).
75. See supra note 5. At most, some courts made passing suggestions that prosecutors
use their judgment in arriving at the number of mail fraud counts charged in relation to a
single fraudulent scheme. See United States v. Joyce, 499 F.2d 9, 25 (7th Cir. 1974)
(Swygert, C.J., concurring in relevant part, joined by the Court) (encouraging prosecutors to
exercise restraint in number of mail or wire fraud charges indicted under single fraudulent
scheme).
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McNally v. United States,76 the Supreme Court held that the “scheme to
defraud” element “clearly protects property rights, but does not refer to []
intangible right[s].”77 The McNally Court invited Congress to change the
statute if it wanted to expand the scope of the statute to include intangible
rights, but noted that “[i]f Congress desires to go further, it must speak
more clearly than it has.”78
Within a year after the Court issued its decision in McNally, Congress
attempted to overturn the McNally decision. In 1988, Congress enacted 18
U.S.C. § 1346 via an eleventh-hour rider to an unrelated bill.79 The onesentence amendment reads: “For the purposes of this chapter, the term
‘scheme or artifice to defraud’ includes a scheme or artifice to deprive
another of the intangible right of honest services.”80 As a consequence of
the manner of Congress’s response to McNally, there is almost no
legislative history, and what little exists tends to cloud rather than clarify
the meaning of the amendment.81 The general tenor of comments made by
members of Congress suggests an intention to overturn McNally. For
example, Representative Conyers stated that the “amendment restores the
mail fraud provision to where [it] was before the McNally decision” such
that it would “no longer [be] necessary to determine whether or not the
scheme . . . involved money or property.”82 While the precise scope of the
76. 483 U.S. 350 (1987).
77. Id. at 356; see also Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 (1987) (describing
its holding in McNally as concluding that the scheme to defraud element did “not reach
‘schemes to defraud citizens of their intangible rights to honest and impartial government’
and that the statute is ‘limited in scope to the protection of property rights’”).
78. 483 U.S. at 360.
79. Act of Nov. 18, 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-690, § 7603, 102 Stat. 4181, 4508. The text
of the amendment was added to the bill on the same day Congress passed it. United States v.
Brumley, 79 F.3d 1430, 1434 (5th Cir. 1996).
80. Act of Nov. 18, 1988 § 7603.
81. As the Fifth Circuit stated in Brumley:
The text of what is now § 1346 was never included in any bill filed in either the
House of Representatives or the Senate . . . was never the subject of any
committee report from either the House or the Senate and was never the subject
of any floor debate reported in the Congressional Record.
Brumley, 79 F.3d at 1436.
82. United States v. Brumley, 116 F.3d 728, 742 (5th Cir. 1997) (quoting 134 CONG.
REC. H11,108-01 (daily ed. Oct. 21, 1988)); see also United States v. Antico, 275 F.3d 245
(3d Cir. 2001) (citing 134 CONG. REC. S17360-02 (daily ed., Nov. 10, 1988) (noting that
Senator Biden, Chair of the Judiciary Committee, asserted the amendment intended to:
“overturn[ ] the decision in McNally v. United States”)). These comments may be of
questionable value in determining congressional intent. Representative Conyer’s comment,
for example, was actually made in reference to another similar proposed amendment, but the
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“scheme or artifice to defraud” element of the mail fraud statute remains for
courts to define, it is clear that in enacting the one-sentence amendment
Congress emphasized its focus on the “scheme and artifice to defraud”
element as the central feature of the mail fraud statute.
The following year, in Schmuck v. United States,83 the Court similarly
turned the focus of the mail fraud statue toward the fraudulent scheme when
it unmistakably relegated the use of the mails to an incidental jurisdictional
element.84 In Schmuck, the Court held that a mailing occurring after a
scheme was consummated was still sufficient to create federal jurisdiction
so long as the scheme was ongoing and continuous.85 In announcing this
holding, the Court articulated a test whereby a fraudulent scheme falls
within the parameters of the mail fraud statute whenever “the mailing is
part of the execution of the scheme as conceived by the perpetrator at the
time.”86 In dissent, Justice Scalia protested, unsuccessfully, that the mail
fraud statute was originally supposed to prohibit “mail fraud, and not mail
and fraud.”87 Schmuck thus marked the end of any plausible argument that
the mailing element remained the gist of the mail fraud statute.
After Schmuck, lower courts found mailings sufficient to invoke federal
jurisdiction in a wider variety of circumstances, even when the mailings had
little relationship to the underlying fraud. Courts have held the mailing
itself need not be false or fraudulent.88 Thus, even routine mailings are
representative ultimately did not vote in favor the amendment as passed. Brumley, 79 F.3d
at 1437 n.6. Conyers made his comments with respect to a bill he and Senator Spector
introduced which used far more expansive language and would have covered schemes to
“defraud[ ] another . . . of intangible rights of any kind whatsoever in any manner or for any
purpose whatsoever . . . .” 133 CONG. REC. E3240-02 (daily ed. Aug. 4, 1987) (quoting H.R.
3089, 100th Cong. (1st Sess. 1987)). This bill was never enacted. Further, Senator Biden’s
comments came after passage of the Act, entitling them to little consideration. Brumley, 79
F.3d at 1437.
83. 489 U.S. 705 (1989).
84. See Peter J. Henning, Maybe It Should Just Be Called Federal Fraud: The Changing
Nature of the Mail Fraud Statute, 36 B.C. L. REV. 435, 458 (1995) (“The Court’s analysis in
Schmuck effectively reduces the mailing element to a mere jurisdictional requirement.”); see
also Kristen Kate Orr, Note, Fencing in the Frontier: A Look into the Limits of Mail Fraud,
95 KY. L.J. 789, 803 (2007) (“But now the breadth of the mailing element has reduced the
element to nothing but a jurisdictional hook, and the statute has become a generic fraud
statute.”).
85. 489 U.S. at 712.
86. Id. at 715.
87. Id. at 723 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
88. See, e.g., United States v. Martin, 228 F.3d 1, 18 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding that
mailing itself need not be deceptive); United States v. Hawkey, 148 F.3d 920, 924 (8th Cir.
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sufficient to invoke federal jurisdiction even when they were innocent
mailings.89 Similarly, courts have found mailings sufficient when they
were made after the allegedly fraudulent activity.90 Courts also found that it
was not necessary for the defendants to contemplate the use of the mails as
a part of the scheme to defraud.91 The government need not even prove
defendants used the mails themselves to satisfy the mailing element—it is
sufficient if it was reasonably foreseeable that any individual would use the
mail.92
This is not to criticize the scope of the mail fraud statute. Indeed, based
on the language of the current version of the mail fraud statute, the use of
the mails should only constitute a jurisdictional element.93 McNally,
Congress’s responsive amendment, and Schmuck only reflect the reality that
the focus of the mail fraud statute is the scheme to defraud element, not the
abuse of the United States mail. Indeed, Congress would soon make the
use of the United States mail unnecessary for a violation of the mail fraud
statute.

1998) (same); United States v. Coyle, 63 F.3d 1239, 1243 (3rd Cir. 1995) (same); United
States v. Morrow, 39 F.3d 1228, 1237 (1st Cir. 1994) (same); United States v. Oldfield, 859
F.2d 392, 400 (6th Cir. 1988) (same); United States v. Kwiat, 817 F.2d 440, 443 (7th Cir.
1987) (same); United States v. Benny, 786 F.2d 1410, 1420 (9th Cir. 1986) (same).
89. See United States v. Frey, 42 F.3d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1994) (finding that a routine
mailing is sufficient); United States v. Nelson, 988 F.2d 798, 804 (8th Cir. 1993) (“A
mailing may be routine or even sent for a legitimate business purpose so long as it assists in
carrying out the fraud.”); United States v. Brocksmith, 991 F.2d 1363, 1368 (7th Cir. 1993)
(same).
90. See United States v. Griffith, 17 F.3d 865, 874 (6th Cir. 1994) (holding a mailing
sufficient even if it occurs after fraudulent acts); Brocksmith, 991 F.2d at 1367-68 (finding a
mailing sent to lull victims into inaction after already victimized by scheme sufficient to
invoke jurisdiction under mail fraud statute); United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 465
(2d Cir. 1991) (holding mailings after fraud to cover up scheme sufficient under mail fraud
statute).
91. See Griffith, 17 F.3d at 874 (stating that the foreseeable use of mails was sufficient);
Nelson, 988 F.2d at 798 (finding that the use of mails need not be contemplated, only
foreseeable); United States v. Hollis, 971 F.2d 1441, 1448 (10th Cir. 1992) (holding that the
reasonable foreseeability that mails will be used is sufficient).
92. See United States v. Pazos, 24 F.3d 660, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (finding a letter from
defendant’s insurance adjuster to insurer’s adjuster); United States v. United Med. &
Surgical Supply Corp., 989 F.2d 1390, 1404 (4th Cir. 1993) (finding a mailing by the agent
sufficient when foreseen or intended by the principal); United States v. Koen, 982 F.2d
1101, 1107 (7th Cir. 1992) (“[I]t is irrelevant that the defendant did not personally mail the
letters . . . .”).
93. 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012).

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2013

302

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 66:287

D. The 1994 Amendment to the Mail Fraud Statute
If there was any question after Schmuck that the use of the United States
mails in connection with a scheme to defraud was only a jurisdictional
element, Congress put that matter to rest by amendment. In 1994, Congress
broadened the mail fraud statute to cover fraudulent schemes where use of
“private or commercial interstate carrier[s]” were involved.94 Thus, abuse
of the United States mail is not only no longer the gist of the mail fraud
statute. It isn’t even necessary. The amended mail fraud statute arguably
creates a general federal fraud offense.95
The amendment was an outgrowth of debate surrounding the passage of
the Senior Citizens Against Marketing Scams Act, which was passed by the
Senate in 1993 and incorporated by the House of Representatives into the
Violent Crimes Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994.96 The
congressional hearings relating to passage of these acts reflected the
concern that telemarketers were evading the mail fraud statute by using
private and commercial carriers to perpetrate frauds.97 Congress did not
define the term “private or commercial interstate carrier,” but courts have
found it encompasses such common carriers as Federal Express and DHL.98
Nor did Congress clarify whether such a carrier must transport the letter or
94. Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-332, §
250006, 108 Stat. 1796, 2087 (codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1994)).
95. See generally Henning, supra note 84 (arguing that the 1994 amendment broadens
the scope of mail fraud statute such that it has become a general federal fraud statute). Of
course, Congress could make it plain by enacting a general fraud statute, simply making it a
federal offense to commit a fraud that affects interstate or foreign commerce.
96. §§ 250001-250008, 108 Stat. at 2081-88.
97. See Mail Fraud: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Postal Operations and Servs. of
the H. Comm. on Post Office and Civil Serv., 103d Cong. 246-300 (1993); International
Consumer Fraud: Can Consumers Be Protected: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Regulation and Gov’t Info. of the S. Comm. on Governmental Affairs, 103d Cong. 12-22, 5059 (1993).
98. See, e.g., United States v. Kieffer, 621 F.3d 825, 832-33 (8th Cir. 2010) (finding
sufficient evidence regarding use of the mails when evidence showed document delivered by
the United States Mail, Federal Express, or United Parcel Service); United States v.
Coughlin, 610 F.3d 89, 97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (finding sufficient evidence of use of the mails
when mail was delivered either by United States Mail or Federal Express); United States v.
Sharpe, 438 F.3d 1257, 1264 (11th Cir. 2006) (finding indictment sufficient when it alleged
defendant used mails through commercial carrier Federal Express); United States v.
Silvestri, 409 F.3d 1311, 1334 n.14 (11th Cir. 2005) (holding that DHL Worldwide Express
is a “commercial interstate carrier” for purposes of the mail fraud statute); United States v.
Gil, 297 F.3d 93, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2002) (finding use of commercial carrier Federal Express
constitutes use of the mails).
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package across a state line, or whether an intrastate delivery suffices so
long as the carrier itself is engaged in interstate commerce.
Courts have answered in the negative the question of whether the letter
or package must cross a state line. Courts have found that, under the
instrumentality of interstate commerce approach, jurisdiction exists if the
commercial carrier was generally engaged in interstate commerce; it is not
necessary that the letter or package actually cross state lines.99 Under this
statutory interpretation, the number of actual mailings becomes
insignificant because the government need only show the fraudulent
scheme involved a commercial carrier engaged in interstate commerce to
establish federal jurisdiction.100
When the government can obtain federal jurisdiction by the use of an
interstate carrier, whether one or many letters were sent becomes
secondary. The effect of the amendment was to make it clear that the gist
of the mail fraud statute was the fraudulent scheme itself and that protection
of the United States mail from abuse was no longer the focus. The
amendment created two possible jurisdictional hooks for federal
prosecution, either one of which is sufficient depending on the facts: (1) if
the United States Postal Service was used, federal jurisdiction is premised
on the Postal Power Clause; or (2) if a commercial carrier was used, federal
jurisdiction is premised on the Commerce Clause.101 By expanding the
99. See, e.g., United States v. Hasner, 340 F.3d 1261, 1270 (11th Cir. 2003) (holding
that mail fraud by use of a private or commercial carrier applies even if the conduct took
place entirely intrastate); Gil, 297 F.3d at 100 (upholding mail fraud count against a
Commerce Clause challenge, reasoning that “private and commercial interstate carriers,
which carry mailings between and among states and countries, are instrumentalities of
interstate commerce, notwithstanding the fact that they also deliver mailings intrastate”);
United States v. Photogrammetric Data Servs., Inc., 259 F.3d 229, 249 (4th Cir. 2001)
(upholding constitutionality of the mail fraud statute as applied to intrastate mailing placed
with private or commercial interstate carrier), abrogated on other grounds by Crawford v.
Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004); see also Henning, supra note 84, at 471-73 (arguing
persuasively that Congress intended the amendment to allow for federal jurisdiction when
carrier was instrumentality of interstate commerce and did not intend to require proof of
actual interstate transportation of mailing at issue).
100. See, e.g., Hasner, 340 F.3d at 1270 (finding jurisdiction based on the interstate
nature of the commercial carrier’s business generally, and not based on the movement of the
actual mailings involved in the fraudulent scheme); Gil, 297 F.3d at 100 (same).
101. See United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 563 (8th Cir. 2012) (holding that
“Congress’s Postal Power provides the jurisdictional basis for . . . the mail fraud statute”
when the United States Postal Service is involved); Hasner, 340 F.3d at 1270 (holding that
when Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1994 to include commercial carriers,
“Congress properly exercised its power under the Commerce Clause”).
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scope of the mail fraud statute to include commercial carriers, the mail
fraud statute targets any fraudulent scheme in which mail is used, regardless
of whether the scheme involved the United States Postal Service.
The evolution of the mail fraud statute from an act designed to protect
the integrity of the United State Postal Service, to a broad catchall statute
used against any type of fraudulent scheme, has eroded support for the oftrepeated holding that Congress intended each separate mailing constitute a
separate offense.102 When Congress amended the mail fraud statute in 1994
to include private and commercial mail carriers, it put beyond debate the
conclusion that the mailing element serves only a jurisdictional function.
Moreover, the conclusion that the mailing element is no longer the gist of
the mail fraud statute is further apparent in light of the jurisprudence
regarding its sister wire fraud statute.
II. The Wire Fraud Statute
Courts have also concluded that the same rule exists with respect to the
less frequently used103 wire fraud statute:104 that is, each use of the wires
constitutes a separate offense.105 If the reasoning supporting the mail fraud
102. The mail fraud statute has been characterized as the “first line of defense” against
new areas of fraud for which Congress has not yet enacted specific prohibitions. See United
States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting); see also Rakoff, supra
note 15, at 772 (stating that the mail fraud statute’s uses are “too numerous to catalog, [but
includes] not only the full range of consumer frauds, stock frauds, land frauds, bank frauds,
insurance frauds, and commodity frauds, but have extended even to such areas as blackmail,
counterfeiting, election fraud, and bribery”); Kathleen Flavin & Kathleen Corrigan, Mail and
Wire Fraud, 33 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 861, 862 (1996) (“When legislatures have been slow to
act in particular areas, these [mail and wire fraud] statutes have ‘frequently represented the
sole instrument of justice that could be wielded against the ever-innovative practitioners of
deceit.’”) (quoting Rakoff, supra note 15, at 772).
103. See Flavin & Corrigan, supra note 102, at 862-63 (stating that the mail fraud statute
“has traditionally been utilized more frequently than its wire fraud companion”).
104. 18 U.S.C. § 1343 (2012).
105. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 527 F.3d 1235, 1241 (11th Cir. 2008) (holding
that each interstate wire transmission constitutes a separate offense); United States v.
Garlick, 240 F.3d 789, 792 (9th Cir. 2001) (“Insofar as we have never expressly held that
each use of the wires constitutes a separate violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1343, we do so now.”);
United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 (1st Cir. 1993) (“‘It is well established that each use of
the wires constitutes a separate crime . . . .’”) (quoting United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829
F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir. 1987)); United States v. Syal, 963 F.2d 900, 907 (6th Cir. 1992)
(rejecting multiplicity challenge to multiple wire fraud counts); United States v. St. Gelais,
952 F.2d 90, 96-97 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Each wire transmission in furtherance of a scheme to
defraud constitutes a separate crime.”); United States v. Heffington, 682 F.2d 1075, 1081
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statute’s unit of prosecution is faulty, application of the same unit of
prosecution to the wire fraud statute is likewise without salvation.
While the legislative history is sparse, Congress enacted the wire fraud
statute in 1952 and explicitly modeled it after the mail fraud statute.106 The
statutory language was identical in all principal respects, save the
jurisdictional element.107 Whereas the mail fraud statute premised federal
jurisdiction on the use of the United States mails originally, and recently
added use of a private or commercial interstate carrier, the wire fraud
statute rests federal jurisdiction upon the Commerce Clause and the actual
crossing of state lines.108 The statutes are considered so identical in all
material respects, however, that cases ruling on one statute constitute
authority with respect to the other.109
(5th Cir. 1982) (“The law is clear, however, that each separate use of wire communications
constitutes a separate offense under § 1343.”); United States v. Giovengo, 637 F.2d 941,
943-44 (3d Cir. 1980) (finding the wire fraud statute to be in pari materia with mail fraud
and consequently giving wire fraud statute broad construction); United States v. Calvert, 523
F.2d 895, 903 n.6 (8th Cir. 1975) (finding that each use of wires constitutes a separate
offense, just like each use of mails); Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n.4 (5th
Cir. 1970) (allowing separate counts for multiple uses of wires in construction fraud).
106. See S. REP. NO. 44, at 14 (1951) (stating 18 U.S.C. § 1344 was designed as “a
parallel [to the] provision now in the law for fraud by mail”).
107. Compare the mail fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1341, to the wire fraud statute, 18
U.S.C. § 1343. The operative language, “Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises,” is identical and is followed a reference to
the means of executing the fraud, either by use of the mails or by a wire transmission.
108. Thus, while one may violate the mail fraud statute though the letter may never leave
the state, to violate the wire fraud statute, the wire communication must actually cross state
lines. See, e.g., United States v. Schaefer, 501 F.3d 1197, 1202 (10th Cir. 2007) (holding the
wire fraud statute requires wire communication cross state lines), overruled on other
grounds by United States v. Sturm, 672 F.3d 891 (10th Cir. 2012); United States v. Izydore,
167 F.3d 213, 219 (5th Cir. 1999) (reversing conviction on wire fraud count where there was
no evidence the phone call crossed state lines); United States v. Cardall, 885 F.2d 656, 675
(10th Cir. 1989) (finding that the government proved wire communication crossed state
lines); Smith v. Ayres, 845 F.2d 1360, 1366 (5th Cir. 1988) (stating that the language in the
wire fraud statute requires wire communication cross state lines).
109. See Carpenter v. United States, 484 U.S. 19, 25 n.6 (1987) (“The mail and wire
fraud statutes share the same language in relevant part, and accordingly we apply the same
analysis to both sets of offenses here.”); see also Garlick, 240 F.3d at 793 (relying on
authority from mail fraud statutes in ruling on wire fraud case); United States v. Mills, 199
F.3d 184, 188 (5th Cir. 1999) (applying mail fraud case law to wire fraud case); United
States v. Manarite, 44 F.3d 1407, 1411 n.5 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he mail fraud and wire fraud
statutes ‘share identical language,’ . . . so [the] wire fraud statute is read in light of the case
law on mail fraud.”); Belt v. United States, 868 F.2d 1208, 1211 (11th Cir. 1989) (stating
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The principle that each use of the wires constitutes a separate offense is
not premised upon a careful analysis of the wire fraud statute itself, but,
rather, it was simply applied to the wire fraud statute because it was the
accepted rule under the mail fraud statute. Wire fraud cases that hold each
wiring constitutes a separate offense cite to mail fraud cases holding that
each mailing constitutes a separate offense,110 which was shown above to
be based on Ex parte Henry.111 Because it has been demonstrated above
that the principle of separate offenses for each mailing is flawed because
the mail fraud statute has changed over time, the same principle with
respect to wire communications is equally flawed. In fact, it is even more
flawed.
The original logic for concluding each mailing should constitute a
separate offense was that each mailing was a separate abuse of the United
States mail, property of the United States government.112 That logic simply
does not apply to the use of the wires. The wires are not government
property. As a result, jurisdiction for the wire fraud statute is premised on
that the wire fraud statute and the mail fraud statute “are given a similar construction and are
subject to the same substantive analysis”); Hofstetter v. Fletcher, 905 F.2d 897, 902 (6th Cir.
1988) (treating the mail and wire fraud statutes in a parallel fashion).
110. This point can be demonstrated again (for the original demonstration, see supra note
105) by tracing the authority that courts have cited for the proposition that each use of the
wires constitutes a separate offense.
The Luongo court cites United States v. Fermin Castillo, 829 F.2d 1194, 1199 (1st Cir.
1987), for its authority, which in turn cites United States v. Calvert, 523 F.2d 895, 903 n.6
(8th Cir. 1975), which in turn relies upon Henderson v. United States, 425 F.2d 134, 138 n. 4
(5th Cir. 1970), which cites for authority two cases, Atkinson v. United States, 418 F.2d
1311, 1313 (8th Cir. 1969), which involved mail fraud and not wire fraud, and Sibley v.
United States, 344 F.2d 103, 105 (5th Cir. 1965), which relies on United States v. Freeling,
31 F.R.D. 540, 549 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). The Freeling court did not rely on any other authority,
but rather, reasoned that it was “difficult to fathom” why, because each separate mailing
constitutes a separate offense, the same rule ought not to apply to the wire fraud statute
because they use identical language.
The Syal Court cites two cases for authority, United States v. Stull, 743 F.2d 439 (6th Cir.
1984), a mail fraud case, and Fermin Castillo, whose history is treated above.
The St. Gelais court cites United States v. Blankenship, 746 F.2d 233, 236 (5th Cir.
1984), a mail fraud case, to support its conclusion that each wire transmission constitutes a
separate offense.
The Heffington court cites two cases for authority, United States v. Crockett, 534 F.2d
589 (5th Cir. 1976), which involved no wire fraud charges but only mail fraud charges, and
Henderson, which as discussed above traces its authority back to the district court’s
reasoning in Freeling that what was good for the goose was good for the gander.
111. See supra notes 44-45 and accompanying text.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 29-45.
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the Commerce Clause.113 Thus, whether one uses the wires once or
multiple times to perpetrate a fraud, each use of the wire does not infringe
upon United States property. It is even clearer, therefore, that the gist of the
wire fraud statute is not each use of the wires, but the fraudulent scheme
itself.114 The use of the wires is only a jurisdictional hook to allow for
federal prosecution of a fraudulent scheme that involved use of the wires.
III. Comparison of Other Statutes Involving Schemes or Artifices to
Defraud
In order to fully comprehend why the gist of the mail and wire fraud
statutes should be the fraudulent scheme, it is helpful to consider other
criminal statutes where Congress has used the phrase “scheme or artifice to
defraud.”
Congress has enacted almost a dozen statutes where it has used that
phrase.115 Several of those statutes are criminal statutes where it is
necessary to determine the unit of prosecution. In other words, the statutes
fail to define whether the unit of prosecution is the fraudulent scheme itself,
or some act, like mailing or wiring, in furtherance of the scheme. Courts
have been inconsistent in determining the unit of prosecution for these
statutes, even though most were explicitly modeled on the mail fraud
statute.116 Among those are the securities fraud, bank fraud, and
bankruptcy fraud statutes.

113. See, e.g., United States v. Louper-Morris, 672 F.3d 539, 563 (8th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Hook, 195 F.3d 299, 310 (7th Cir. 1999); United States v. Darby, 37 F.3d 1059,
1067 (4th Cir. 1994).
114. See United States v. Bryan, 58 F.3d 933, 943 (4th Cir. 1995) (“[T]he gravamen of
the offense of wire fraud is simply the execution of a scheme to defraud.”), abrogated on
other grounds by United States v. O’Hagan, 521 U.S. 642 (1997).
115. Congress has used the phrase “scheme or artifice to defraud” in multiple statutes.
See, e.g., 7 U.S.C. § 6o(1)(A) (2012) (commodity trading advisors, commodity pool
operators, and associated persons); 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a)(1) (2012) (sales of securities); 15
U.S.C. § 78jjj(c)(1)(A) (2012) (liquidation proceedings or direct payment procedures by
broker-dealers); 15 U.S.C. § 1703(a)(2)(A) (2012) (interstate land sales); 15 U.S.C. § 80b6(1) (2012) (investment advisors); 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012) (bankruptcy fraud); 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(E) (2012) (civil forfeiture); 18 U.S.C. § 982(a)(4) (2012) (criminal forfeiture); 18
U.S.C. § 1343 (2012) (wire fraud); and 18 U.S.C. § 2314 (2012) (transportation of stolen
goods, securities, etc.).
116. See infra Part III.A-C.
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A. Securities Fraud Statute
The securities fraud statute117 is particularly instructive because it
contains a mailing element very similar to the mailing element in the mail
fraud statute.118 Securities fraud occurs when false or misleading
statements are used in connection with the purchase or sale of securities.119
Again, the statutory language is slightly different from that used in the mail
fraud statute. The actus reus, that is the act which makes it a crime, is the
“use” or “employment” of a manipulative or deceptive device in connection
with the purchase or sale of securities.120 The use of interstate commerce or
the mails to execute the scheme provides the basis for federal
jurisdiction.121 Thus, the appropriate unit of prosecution is the purchase or
sale of a security, not the mailing.122 In securities fraud cases, the mailing
element serves merely a jurisdictional purpose.123 Several purchases or
sales may be made within a single manipulative scheme and each may
constitute a separate offense if each was made using a false statement of
material fact.124 Therefore, the unit of prosecution is neither the “scheme”
117. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2012). This article references the securities fraud statute
enacted by the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. For purposes of the unit of prosecution
analysis addressed in this article, the 1933 Act contains substantially identical language
regarding the unit of prosecution.
118. 15 U.S.C. § 78j. The Securities Exchange Commission promulgated regulation 10b5, directed at securities fraud, which further speaks in terms of schemes or artifices to
defraud. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (2012).
119. See Belmont v. MB Inv. Partners, Inc., 708 F.3d 470, 493 (3d Cir. 2013) (“To make
out a securities fraud claim under Rule 10b-5, a plaintiff must show [inter alia] that the
defendant made a materially false or misleading statement or omitted to state a material fact
necessary to make a statement not misleading . . . .”) (internal quotation and citation
omitted).
120. See 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b).
121. See United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 803 n.20 (11th Cir. 1991) (finding
mailing element only jurisdictional).
122. Id. at 804; United States v. Rigas, 281 F. Supp. 2d 660, 667 (S.D.N.Y. 2003)
(finding the unit of prosecution under the securities fraud statute is any transaction
connected to the purchase or sale of a security). But see United States v. Mackay, 491 F.2d
616, 619 (10th Cir. 1974) (“The jurisdictional basis [under both securities fraud and mail
fraud] is . . . the use of the mails or an instrumentality of commerce and as such each mailing
is regarded as a separate crime even though it relates to essentially the same fraudulent
scheme.”). The Langford court points out that the Mackay court only cited two mail fraud
cases in support of its holding. Langford, 946 F.2d at 804 n.23.
123. Langford, 946 F.2d at 803 n.20 (finding the legislative history of 15 U.S.C. § 78j
limits scope to “transactions effected by the use of the mails,” relegating use of mails to a
merely jurisdictional function).
124. Id. at 803.
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nor each mailing, but the purchase or sale of a security.125 Of course, this
requires courts to carefully evaluate the scope of the scheme to defraud on a
case-by-case basis.
Thus, under the securities fraud statute the courts have determined the
unit of prosecution based upon the essence of the criminal conduct, that is,
the execution of the fraudulent scheme. In contrast to the mail fraud
statute, courts have not concluded that each mailing in furtherance of a
securities fraud scheme constitutes a separate offense. This highlights the
shortcoming of mail fraud jurisprudence’s focus on the basis of federal
jurisdiction to determine the unit of prosecution.
B. The Bank Fraud Statute
In 1984, Congress enacted the bank fraud statute126 in response to the
savings and loan crisis to address gaps in federal jurisdiction regarding
frauds upon financial institutions.127 Congress modeled the statute after the
mail and wire fraud statutes.128 Jurisdiction for the mail fraud statute,
however, is based on the Postal Power Clause and the Commerce Clause,
the wire fraud statute is based on the Commerce Clause, but the bank fraud
statute is based on the involvement of federal property in the form of
federal insurance on deposits.129
125. Id. Courts have reached the same conclusion with respect to 15 U.S.C. § 77q(a),
which provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person in the offer or sale of any securities . . . by
the use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or by the use of the mails, directly or indirectly-(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud, or
(2) to obtain money or property by means of any untrue statement of a
material fact . . . necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading; or
(3) to engage in any transaction, practice, or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon the purchaser.
15 U.S.C. § 77q(a); see United States v. Ashdown, 509 F.2d 793, 800 (5th Cir. 1975).
126. 18 U.S.C. § 1344 (2012).
127. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 378 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3519.
128. Id.; see also United States v. Solomonson, 908 F.2d 358, 364 (8th Cir. 1990)
(“Section 1344 was modeled after the mail and wire fraud statutes.”); United States v.
Bonallo, 858 F.2d 1427, 1432-33 (9th Cir. 1988) (noting that the Senate Report stated that
the bank fraud statute is modeled after the mail fraud statute, and that the House Judiciary
Committee, in considering the bank fraud statute, endorsed the broad reading given to mail
fraud).
129. S. REP. NO. 98-225, at 378-79 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 31282, 3519.
Though the 1989 amendment to the bank fraud statute deleted specific references to
“federally chartered or insured financial institution” (see Act of Aug. 9, 1989, Pub. L. 101-
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Initially courts followed the case law with respect to the unit of
prosecution under those statutes and found that each financial transaction in
furtherance of a bank fraud scheme constituted a separate offense,
recognizing the bank fraud statute was modeled on the mail fraud and wire
fraud statutes.130 That changed, however, with later decisions.131 In
interpreting the bank fraud statute, courts have held that each “execution of
a scheme to defraud” constitutes a separate offense, not each financial
transaction made in furtherance of the scheme.132 Thus, the critical task for
a court is defining the scope of the fraudulent scheme.133 The resolution of
this issue turns on such fact specific inquiries as whether the loans in
question were related, whether they came from a single bank, and the
number of movements of money.134
73, 103 Stat. 183), it is still necessary to show it as the basis for federal jurisdiction. See,
e.g., United States v. Flanders, 491 F.3d 1197, 1208 (10th Cir. 2007) (including as an
element of the offense of willful misapplication of funds a requirement to show the bank
involved in the fraud was federally insured); United States v. Ragosta, 970 F.2d 1085, 1089
n.1 (2d Cir. 1992) (explaining that the elements of the offense include showing the financial
institution was federally chartered or insured).
130. See, e.g., United States v. Mason, 902 F.2d 1434, 1437-38 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating
that each check drawn on account constituted a separate offense in furtherance of fraud
scheme), overruled on other grounds by United States v. Doe, 705 F.3d 1134 (9th Cir.
2013); United States v. Schwartz, 899 F.2d 243, 248 (3d Cir. 1990) (noting that each deposit
constituted a separate offense in furtherance of fraud scheme); Poliak, 823 F.2d at 372
(finding language of 18 U.S.C. § 1344 “plainly and unambiguously allows charging each
execution of the scheme to defraud as a separate act”).
131. The change started with the decision in United States v. Lemons, in which the Fifth
Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished the mail fraud and wire fraud statutory language from
the bank fraud statutory language and held that the unit of prosecution for purposes of the
bank fraud statute was the “scheme” itself, not each financial transaction made in
furtherance of the scheme. 941 F.2d 309 (5th Cir. 1991).
132. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1994) (holding that
each of multiple loans from a single institution fraudulently obtained as part of common
scheme to raise money constituted separate offenses because each loan created a separate
risk to the bank); United States v. Rimell, 21 F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1994) (“[E]ach separate
execution of a scheme to defraud may be pled as a distinct count of the indictment.”); United
States v. Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir. 1994) (finding that each loan based on
fraudulent, over-valued appraisals constituted separate offenses); United States v. Heath, 970
F.2d 1397, 1401-02 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding that two loans taken out in furtherance of single
scheme to defraud bank out of ten million dollars constituted one offense of bank fraud);
Lemons, 941 F.2d at 314 (finding that several transfers of funds in furtherance of single
scheme to defraud constituted a single offense).
133. Wall, 37 F.3d at 1446; United States v. Barnhart, 979 F.2d 647, 651 (8th Cir. 1992).
134. See Wall, 37 F.3d at 1446 (reviewing cases evaluating various such factors in
determining the scope of the scheme to defraud); Brandon, 17 F.3d at 422 (same).
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As to the unit of prosecution, in distinguishing the bank fraud statute
from the mail and wire fraud statutes courts have focused on the statutory
language.135 The mail fraud statute speaks in terms of using the mail to
execute a scheme to defraud, whereas the bank fraud statute speaks in terms
of executing a scheme to defraud using financial transactions.136 Thus,
courts conclude executing the scheme to defraud is the focus of the bank
fraud statute.137 This is a legitimate distinction based on subtle differences
in the statutory language. This begs the primary question raised by this
article: whether the mail fraud statute should be reworded to mirror similar
statutes that focus the unit of prosecution on the execution of the scheme to
defraud.
C. Bankruptcy Fraud
In 1994, Congress criminalized engagement in a scheme or artifice to
defraud in relation to a bankruptcy matter.138 There are three subsections to
the bankruptcy fraud statute.139 A person who has devised a scheme or
135. See United States v. Wiehl, 904 F. Supp. 81, 86-87 (N.D.N.Y. 1995) (distinguishing
the unit of prosecution under the mail fraud statute from the unit of prosecution under the
major fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1031, based on nuances in the statutory language,
supporting its conclusion by comparison to the statutory language of the bank fraud statute).
136. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised . . . any scheme or
artifice to defraud . . . for the purpose of executing such scheme or artifice . . . places in any
post office . . . any matter or thing whatever [shall be punished].”), with 18 U.S.C. § 1344
(2012) (“Whoever knowingly executes . . . a scheme or artifice . . . to defraud [shall be
punished].”).
137. See, e.g., United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (“The
unit of the offense created by § 1344 is each execution or attempted execution of the scheme
to defraud, not each act in furtherance thereof.”) (citations omitted); Lemons, 941 F.2d at
317 (finding that bank fraud language prohibiting the “execution” of a fraudulent scheme
sufficient to distinguish it from the mail fraud statute’s language prohibiting “devising”
fraudulent schemes); Heath, 970 F.2d at 1402 (same).
138. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 312, 108 Stat. 4106, 4138.
139. 18 U.S.C. § 157 provides:
A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to
defraud and for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or
artifice or attempting to do so-[1]. Files a petition under title 11 . . .;
2. [F]iles a document in a proceeding under title 11; or
3. [M]akes a false or fraudulent representation, claim, or promise concerning or
in relation to a proceeding under title 11, at any time before or after the filing of
a petition, or in relation to a proceeding falsely asserted to be pending under
such title shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years, or
both.
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artifice to defraud violates the bankruptcy fraud act if, for the purpose of
executing or concealing the fraudulent scheme, the person: (1) files a
bankruptcy petition;140 (2) files a document with the bankruptcy court;141 or
(3) makes a false or fraudulent representation concerning or in relation to a
bankruptcy proceeding.142 Neither the first nor second subsection requires
that the petition or pleading itself be false, fraudulent, or misleading.143 In
drafting the bankruptcy fraud statute, Congress modeled it after the mail
fraud statute.144 Indeed, the language very closely resembles that of the
mail fraud statute. It contains similar introductory, dependent language
regarding a requirement that someone have devised a scheme to defraud.145
Though there is a paucity of case law interpreting this statute, it has now
been law for fifteen years. Most courts have interpreted the bankruptcy

18 U.S.C. § 157 (2010).
140. See, e.g., United States v. Wagner, 382 F.3d 598, 612 (6th Cir. 2004) (holding that
the first subsection of § 157 has three elements: “1) the existence of a scheme to defraud or
intent to later formulate a scheme to defraud and 2) the filing of a bankruptcy petition 3) for
the purpose of executing or attempting to execute the scheme”) (quoting United States v.
DeSantis, 237 F.3d 607, 613 (6th Cir. 2001).
141. See id. (stating that the second subsection of § 157 has elements identical to the first
except that it requires the filing of a document in a proceeding under Title 11).
142. DeSantis, 237 F.3d at 613.
143. See Wagner, 382 F.3d at 612 (setting forth elements of bankruptcy fraud under the
first two elements).
144. 140 CONG. REC. H10752-01, at H10773 (daily ed. Oct. 4, 1994) (statement of Rep.
Howard Berman); see also Wagner, 382 F.3d at 613 n.3 (looking to analysis of the mail and
wire fraud statutes in holding that actual reliance on the scheme to defraud is not an essential
element of the crime); United States v. Daniels, 247 F.3d 598, 600 (5th Cir. 2001) (citing the
constitutionality of the mail fraud statute in holding the holding the bankruptcy fraud statute
constitutional); 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 7.07[1][a], at 7-119 (Alan N. Resnick et al.
eds., 16th ed. 2009) (“Section 157 is consciously patterned on the federal mail fraud
statute.”).
145. Compare 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (2012) (“Whoever, having devised or intending to devise
any scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or
fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan, exchange,
alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or
spurious coin, obligation, security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimated
or held out to be such counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing such
scheme or artifice or attempting so to do.”) (emphasis added), with 18 U.S.C. § 157 (2012)
(“A person who, having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud and
for the purpose of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do
so.”). Indeed, but for the McNally-fix language regarding intangible rights and archaic
language regarding “spurious” items, the language is virtually identical.
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fraud statute by borrowing court interpretation of the mail fraud statute.146
Nevertheless, what little case law exists demonstrates courts have been
inconsistent in determining the unit of prosecution. For example, one
federal circuit court held that each bankruptcy filing made in relation to a
scheme to defraud is a separate violation of § 157.147 Another appellate
court, however, found multiple bankruptcy filings made in relation to a
scheme to defraud to be a single violation of § 157.148
In light of the case law comparing the statutory language of the bank
fraud statute with that of the mail fraud statute, it would seem that the
bankruptcy fraud statutory construction would track the mail fraud statutory
construction. That is, because the mail fraud and bankruptcy fraud
statutory language both emphasize the method by which the fraudulent
scheme is executed and not the execution of the scheme itself, the unit of
prosecution under the bankruptcy fraud statute would have to be each
petition or document filed. Following this logic, though there be but one
fraudulent scheme to defraud, under the bankruptcy fraud statute it would
be a separate crime each time a petition or other document is filed in
bankruptcy court.
Should this be the case? When a person engages in a fraudulent scheme
in connection with a bankruptcy case, the number of documents that happen
to be filed in connection with the bankruptcy may have nothing to do with
the extent or nature of the fraudulent conduct. Under the first two
subsections of the bankruptcy fraud statute, the petition or document filed
with the court need not itself be fraudulent.149 Thus, the number of
documents filed may have no relationship at all with the defendant’s
criminal culpability. Yet, if the courts follow the statutory construction,

146. See United States v. Milwitt, 475 F.3d 1150, 1155 n.5 (9th Cir. 2007) (“Most of the
few courts that have interpreted 18 U.S.C. § 157 have looked to 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343
for guidance” and collecting cases and authorities).
147. See DeSantis, 237 F.3d at 613 (holding that if a defendant, having devised a scheme
to defraud and filed a bankruptcy petition with the purpose of executing a scheme to defraud,
had undertaken a variety of other acts, such as filing a reorganization plan or making a false
statement in a meeting of creditors, for the purpose of executing the scheme, he would be
subject to additional counts of § 157).
148. See United States v. Naegele, 341 B.R. 349, 364 (D.D.C. 2006) (finding indictment
which charged a violation of § 157 not improper because, while it alleged a number of acts
in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud, they were set out in a “manner and means”
section of the indictment and were not alleged as additional counts).
149. See Wagner, 382 F.3d at 612 (setting forth the elements of the first two subsections
of § 157).
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given the almost identical language of the mail fraud statute, courts would
have to conclude that each filing constitutes a separate offense.
A comparison of multiple other fraud statutes, each modeled after the
mail fraud statute, reflects a multitude of conclusions as to the appropriate
unit of prosecution. Although different conclusions might find support
based in subtleties in statutory language, the previous discussion shows that
these may be distinctions without differences. Moreover, it is only with
regard to the mail fraud statute, and its companion wire fraud statute, that
courts still cling to the conclusion that the unit of prosecution should be
based on the act giving rise to federal jurisdiction. A consistent approach
across the “scheme to defraud” statutes is needed.
IV. The Unit of Prosecution Under the Mail Fraud Statute Should Not Be
the Use of the Mails
The analysis of the mail fraud statute’s evolution shows its shift from a
statute based on the Postal Power Clause and designed to protect the United
States Postal Service from abuse, to a statute based on both the Postal
Power and Commerce Clauses designed to protect people from fraudulent
schemes where mailings are used to execute the fraudulent scheme. This
leads to the conclusion that the tired truism that each mailing automatically
constitutes a separate offense should be rejected. Established precedent,
however, now precludes courts from determining anew whether each
mailing should constitute a separate offense of the mail fraud statute or
whether there is a more appropriate unit of prosecution.150 Changing the
unit of prosecution would require district courts to untether themselves
from to the Ex parte Henry holding, flout binding precedent, and analyze
the nature of the offense itself to determine whether charging each mailing
as a separate offense is the appropriate unit of prosecution. Accordingly, a
legislative fix is the only option to clarify its intended unit of prosecution.
A. Why It Is Important to Determine the Unit of Prosecution
Determining the unit of prosecution is important to determine whether an
indictment is multiplicitous. Treating each mailing as a separate offense
makes application of the mail fraud statute potentially overinclusive in the
sense that it can include, as separate criminal offenses, conduct which is in
furtherance of a single criminal offense. Charging the same criminal
150. See Arizona v. Rumsey, 467 U.S. 203, 212 (1984) (holding that stare decisis, the
policy of courts to stand by precedent and not to disturb a settled point, is to be followed
absent “special justification”).
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behavior in several counts constitutes multiplicity.151 Determining whether
counts are multiplicitous turns on what Congress intended as the
appropriate unit of prosecution.152 Multiplicity analysis therefore requires
an evaluation of the statute and its legislative history to determine the
gravamen of the offense,153 even if each charge appears to require proof of
different facts.154 Unless Congress has clearly and unequivocally indicated
that each act constitutes a separate offense, the rule of lenity, which requires
“ambiguous criminal laws to be interpreted in favor of the defendants
151. See United States v. Fleming, 19 F.3d 1325, 1330 (10th Cir. 1994) (“[M]ultiplicity
refers to multiple counts of an indictment which cover the same criminal behavior.”)
(quoting United States v. Dashney, 937 F.2d 532, 540 n.7 (10th Cir. 1991)); United States v.
Allen, 13 F.3d 105, 107 (4th Cir. 1993) (defining multiplicity as “the charging of each act in
a series of identical acts as though it were a separate crime”); United States v. Rimell, 21
F.3d 281, 287 (8th Cir. 1994) (“An indictment which charges a single offense in multiple
counts is multiplicitous.”); United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 (11th Cir. 1991)
(“Multiplicity is the charging of a single offense in more than one count.”); see also 1A
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & ANDREW D. LEIPOLD, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
CRIMINAL § 142 (4th ed. 2008) (“[M]ultiplicity is charging a single offense in several
counts.”).
152. See Langford, 946 F.2d at 802 (“To determine whether an indictment is
multiplicitous, we first determine the allowable unit of prosecution.”).
153. See United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1995) (“The yardstick in
determining whether there is . . . multiplicity is whether one offense or separate offenses are
charged, and . . . this is a difficult and subtle question. The test announced most often in
cases is that offenses are separate if each requires proof of an additional fact that the other
does not. This seems of little value as a test. The real question is one of legislative intent, to
be ascertained from all the data available.”) (quoting 1 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 142 (2d ed. 1982)); United States v. Bennett, 44 F.3d 1364,
1373 (8th Cir. 1995) (“First, a court must ask whether Congress ‘intended that each violation
be a separate offense.’ If it did not, there is no statutory basis for the two prosecutions, and
the double jeopardy inquiry is at an end. Second, if Congress intended separate prosecutions,
a court must then determine whether the relevant offenses constitute the ‘same offense’
within the meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause.”) (citations omitted); United States v.
Meuli, 8 F.3d 1481, 1485 (10th Cir. 1993) (“In reviewing multiplicity claims we look to the
language of the statute to determine whether Congress intended multiple convictions and
sentences under the statute.”); see also WRIGHT, supra note 151, § 142 (“[A]t its core, the
issue of duplicity or multiplicity is one of statutory interpretation.”). But see Iannelli v.
United States, 420 U.S. 770, 785 n.17 (1975) (noting that offenses are considered separate,
and therefore not multiplicitous, if each requires proof of a fact not common to the others).
154. See, e.g., United States v. Woodward, 469 U.S. 105, 108-10 (1985) (per curiam)
(reviewing legislative history to determine congressional intent regarding statutes which, on
their face, required proof of different facts); Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 340-42
(1981) (explaining that the Blockburger test for Double Jeopardy Clause violations is merely
a rule of statutory construction, thus making analysis of legislative history necessary to
determine congressional intent if possible).
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subjected to them,”155 suggests courts should find a single offense.156 The
rule of lenity comes into play, however, only when a statute is deemed
ambiguous.157 Courts have rejected application of the rule in multiplicity
challenges to the mail and wire fraud statutes by merely repeating the
truism that each mailing or use of the wires constitutes a separate offense.158
Determining the appropriate unit of prosecution under the mail fraud and
wire fraud statutes is more than an academic exercise. First, multiplicity
poses the danger of imposing multiple sentences for a single offense159 in
violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution. The Double Jeopardy Clause provides that no
person shall “be subject for the same offence [sic] to be twice put in
jeopardy of life or limb.”160 When each mailing is a separate offense,
multiple charges for multiple mailings do not violate the Double Jeopardy
Clause. If this is wrong, however, and each mailing should not constitute a
separate offense, then multiple charges for multiple mailings could violate
the Double Jeopardy Clause.
Second, charging a defendant in multiple counts for a single offense may
improperly “suggest to the jury that the defendant committed more than one

155. See United States v. Santos, 553 U.S. 507, 514 (2008).
156. See Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808, 812 (1971) (“[A]mbiguity concerning the
ambit of criminal statutes should be resolved in favor of lenity.”); Bell v. United States, 349
U.S. 81, 84 (1955) (“[I]f Congress does not fix the punishment for a federal offense clearly
and without ambiguity, doubt will be resolved against turning a single transaction into
multiple offenses . . . .”); see also United States v. Polouizzi, 564 F.3d 142, 158 (2d Cir.
2009) (finding the rule of lenity forbids treating as multiple offenses each child pornographic
image received in a single transaction because congressional intent as to the unit of
prosecution was ambiguous); United States v. Vargas-Castillo, 329 F.3d 715, 721-22 (9th
Cir. 2003) (stating that the rule of lenity was not violated with regard to indictment on two
charges of importation and possession of cocaine and marijuana because Congress
unambiguously intended for each controlled substance to be a unit of prosecution).
157. Bifulco, 447 U.S. at 387.
158. See, e.g., United States v. Luongo, 11 F.3d 7, 9 n.6 (1st Cir. 1993) (“As the wire
fraud statute is unambiguous, and the principle that each use of the wires constitutes a
separate violation of section 1343 has been widely accepted for many years, we have no
occasion to engage the rule of lenity.”) (citations omitted).
159. See United States v. Christner, 66 F.3d 922, 927 (8th Cir. 1995); United States v.
Brandon, 17 F.3d 409, 422 (1st Cir. 1994); United States v. Haddock, 956 F.2d 1534, 1546
(10th Cir. 1992), abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Wells, 519 U.S. 482
(1997); United States v. Langford, 946 F.2d 798, 802 (11th Cir. 1991); United States v.
Duncan, 850 F.2d 1104, 1108 n.4 (6th Cir. 1988), overruled on other grounds by Schad v.
Arizona, 501 U.S. 624 (1991); United States v. Hearod, 499 F.2d 1003, 1005 (5th Cir. 1974).
160. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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crime” for the purpose of trying improperly to influence the jury.161 In
other words, a large number of charges may give the impression of greater
criminal activity or culpability than may have actually occurred.162
Third, multiplicitous counts can create the possibility of compromise
verdicts in which jurors strike deals to find a defendant guilty of one or
more counts in exchange for acquitting the defendant on other counts as a
means of reaching a verdict.163 This is possible if multiple mail fraud
counts are charged for each mailing, whereas it would not be possible if a
single mail fraud count reflected the scheme to defraud regardless of the
number of mailings.
Fourth, when the government charges multiple counts for acts that
appear to arise from a single course of conduct, it may create the
appearance the government did so in an effort to skew plea bargaining. The
argument, for example, is that by charging a defendant with thirty counts of
mail fraud arising from a single fraudulent scheme, which resulted in thirty
mailings, the government has attempted to intimidate a defendant, creating
the appearance of greater exposure to criminal liability.164
Finally, multiplicitous mail fraud or wire fraud charges pose an
additional, perhaps unique danger, when they are used as predicate acts for
a Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) charge. Under
the RICO Act, prosecutors must prove two or more predicate violations of
specific federal and state crimes set forth in the statute.165 Mail fraud and

161. See Christner, 66 F.3d at 927 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 921 F.2d 194, 196
(8th Cir. 1990)).
162. See, e.g., Langford, 946 F.2d at 802 (“[A] multiplicitous indictment may improperly
prejudice a jury by suggesting that a defendant has committed several crimes -- not one.”)
(citing United States v. Reed, 639 F.2d 896, 904 (2d Cir. 1981)); Duncan, 850 F.2d at 1108
n.4 (holding that multiplicity poses the danger that “prolix recitation may falsely suggest to a
jury that a defendant has committed not one but several crimes.”); United States v.
Marquardt, 786 F.2d 771, 778 (7th Cir. 1986) (noting that multiplicity creates a danger of
prejudicing jury against defendant by creating impression of more criminal activity than
what actually occurred); Reed, 639 F.2d at 904 (stating that one vice of multiplicity is that it
“may improperly prejudice a jury by suggesting that a defendant has committed not one but
several crimes”) (citing United States v. Carter, 576 F.2d 1061, 1064 (3d Cir. 1978)).
163. See also Michael L. Seigel & Christopher Slobogin, Prosecuting Martha: Federal
Prosecutorial Power and the Need for a Law of Counts, 109 PENN ST. L. REV. 1107, 112526 (2005).
164. See id. at 1126-27.
165. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (2012); see also United States v. Tello, 687 F.3d 785, 792
(7th Cir. 2012) (holding that to violate the RICO statute, “an individual must, among other
things, participate in two or more predicate acts of racketeering”).
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wire fraud violations constitute predicate offenses under the RICO statute166
and are often used as predicate offenses in RICO prosecutions.167 If a
RICO charge is based upon alleged multiple violations of the mail fraud
statute then, when multiple mailings were made in execution of a single
scheme to defraud, a defendant may wrongfully be convicted of violating
RICO.168 For example, courts have recognized that multiple mail and wire
fraud charges pose a unique danger when used as predicate offenses under
RICO because the number of charges seldom correlates directly to a real
pattern of racketeering activity.169 If each mailing or wiring would no
longer constitute a separate offense, it would eliminate this potential
problem with using mail and wire fraud offenses as predicate acts under the
RICO statute.
Although the mail and wire fraud statutes are overinclusive, treating each
mailing or each wiring as a separate offense can be underinclusive by
operation of the five-year statute of limitations.170 Because the mailing or
wiring is the unit of prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes, “the
statute of limitations . . . runs from the date of [the last mailing or wiring] in

166. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1).
167. See, e.g., Cleveland v. United States, 531 U.S. 12, 25 (2000) (mail fraud); United
States v. Whitfield, 590 F.3d 325, 342 (5th Cir. 2009) (wire fraud); United States v. Ganim,
510 F.3d 134, 140-41 (2d Cir. 2007) (mail fraud); United States v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 832,
837 (6th Cir. 2006) (mail fraud); United States v. Peter, 310 F.3d 709, 711 (11th Cir. 2002)
(mail fraud).
168. See United States v. Horak, 833 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1987) (noting that
multiple mailings in furtherance of a single scheme to defraud may not constitute a pattern
of predicate offenses under the RICO statute, though each mailing may constitute a separate
offense).
169. See Lipin Enters. Inc. v. Lee, 803 F.2d 322, 325 (7th Cir. 1986) (Cudahy, J.,
concurring) (“Mail fraud and wire fraud are perhaps unique among the various sorts of
‘racketeering activity’ possible under RICO in that the existence of a multiplicity of
predicate acts . . . may be of no indication of the requisite continuity of the underlying
fraudulent activity. Thus, a multiplicity of mailings does not necessarily translate into a
‘pattern’ of racketeering activity.”); accord Elliott v. Chi. Motor Club Ins., 809 F.2d 347,
350 (7th Cir. 1986).
170. 18 U.S.C. § 3282 provides for a five-year statute of limitations for most federal
offenses, including mail and wire fraud. See, e.g., United States v. McGowan, 590 F.3d 446,
456 (7th Cir. 2009); United States v. Pearson, 340 F.3d 459, 464 (7th Cir. 2003); United
States v. McDonald, 576 F.2d 1350, 1357 (9th Cir. 1978). 18 U.S.C. § 3293(2), however,
extends the statute of limitations for mail and wire fraud to ten years if the offense affects a
financial institution.
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furtherance of the scheme.”171 Thus, the statute of limitations may bar
prosecutions of ongoing fraudulent schemes simply because the mailing or
wiring upon which the offense rests occurred outside the statute of
limitations.
It is not difficult to imagine a fraudulent scheme that starts with a
mailing or wiring but that is then executed over some period of time by
other acts in furtherance of the scheme. For example, a simple scheme to
defraud might involve a mailing to a victim soliciting money for a fictitious
charity, followed by a personal visit by the criminal to the home of the
victim to solicit the charitable contribution. If the mailing took place five
years and one day ago, but the personal visit took place four years and 364
days ago, prosecution under the mail fraud statute would be barred.172
Were the scheme to defraud the unit of prosecution, on the other hand, then
the statute of limitations would run from the last act committed in
furtherance of that scheme.173 This would expand the scope of fraudulent
schemes that could be charged under the mail and wire fraud statutes.
Determining the unit of prosecution is not an academic exercise. It
implicates defendants’ constitutional rights and can influence everything
from plea bargaining to the manner in which juries reach their verdicts. If,
as this article posits, the real gist of the mail fraud statute is no longer each
separate mailing made in connection with a scheme to defraud, but rather,
each execution of a scheme to defraud, then it is important that Congress
change the statute.

171. United States v. Eckhardt, 843 F.2d 989, 993 (7th Cir. 1988); see also McDonald,
576 F.2d at 1357 (finding the statute of limitations for mail fraud runs from last mailing
made in furtherance of the fraudulent scheme).
172. Admittedly, there are no reported decisions where the government’s prosecution of
a fraudulent scheme was barred in circumstances similar to this hypothetical, but, of course,
one would not expect there to be. The government would be unlikely to ever charge this
conduct knowing that it was barred by the statute of limitations, or if it did, would have the
case dismissed at the district court level.
173. See United States v. Najjor, 255 F.3d 979, 983-84 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding that
“executing a scheme to defraud” under the bank fraud statute “is a continuing offense” for
statute of limitations purposes such that the statute of limitations begins to run when the last
act in furtherance of the scheme is committed); United States v. Anderson, 188 F.3d 886,
889-90 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting that the defendant’s refinancing of a fraudulent loan within
five years of the criminal charge brought the fraudulent scheme within the bank fraud statute
of limitations).
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B. Reworking the Mail Fraud Statute to Change the Unit of Prosecution
The gravamen of the mail fraud statute as currently written is the
execution of the underlying scheme to defraud, not the use of the mails.
The appropriate unit of prosecution under the mail and wire fraud statutes,
therefore, should focus on the execution of the scheme to defraud, not on
the mailings or use of the wires. Like the bank fraud statute, the unit of
prosecution should be logically related to the fraudulent scheme. As
discussed above, however, courts have seized upon nuanced differences in
the language of other statutes, such as the bank fraud statute, to determine
that the unit of prosecution is different.174 It will therefore require a change
in the mail fraud statute to make it clear that Congress did not intend to
create different units of prosecution under these similar statutes.
The conclusion that the mailing is the gist of the mail fraud statute, such
that each mailing constitutes a separate offense, is a matter of judicial
misinterpretation of congressional intent.175 To reverse decades of
precedent misinterpreting congressional intent, therefore, Congress needs to
clarify the intent of the current version of the mail fraud statute. Congress
could recognize the mail fraud statute’s unique history, the evolution of its
language, and the shift in focus from mailing to the fraudulent scheme and
abandon the untenable truism that each mailing constitutes a separate
offense. Congress could clarify its intent that the gist of the mail fraud
statute, and its sister the wire fraud statute, is the execution of the scheme to
defraud.
Because courts have distinguished the mail fraud statute from other
similar statutes based on statutory language, the mail fraud jurisprudence
may be so entrenched that it is unrealistic to expect courts to abandon their
past reasoning. Accordingly, it is necessary for Congress to amend the mail
fraud statute. This could be accomplished by changing the language “for
the purpose of executing such a scheme” to “executes such a scheme,” such
that the language matches that of the bank fraud statute.176 This would
indicate clear congressional intent to make the scheme to defraud itself the
gist of the mail fraud and wire fraud statutes and free the courts from the
burden of its precedent that was based on a prior version of the statute.
The unit of prosecution test used for mail and wire fraud should be the
same as used for bank fraud: each execution of a mail or wire fraud scheme
should constitute a separate offense, regardless of the number of times the
174. See supra notes 130-134 and accompanying text.
175. See supra Part I.
176. See infra Appendix C.
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mails or wires were used. In some cases, each mailing may constitute an
execution of a scheme to defraud, while in other instances multiple mailings
may simply be multiple acts in furtherance of a single fraudulent scheme.
The focus should be on the relationship between the mailing (or wire) and
the fraudulent scheme.177 In determining whether there is one or more
schemes to defraud, courts should consider such factors as whether the
mailings were related to or dependent on each other and whether each
mailing caused, or risked, a separate harm to the victim.
Though courts do not explicitly list “harm” as a factor for consideration,
it underlies their analysis in the structuring of bank fraud cases. For
example, in addressing the anti-structuring statute, one court determined
that whether the defendants made a single deposit or hundreds of deposits
was irrelevant in determining their culpability.178 Similarly, with regard to
bank fraud, some courts consider whether the act in question created a
separate risk of harm to the bank.179 The same analysis of harm should be
applied to the mail fraud statute. This approach would recognize the fact
that sometimes multiple mailings create a greater danger of harm, while in
other cases they do not.180

177. For example, a fraudulent mail order scheme whereby each customer is defrauded
should fairly be considered separate schemes to defraud each customer. A separate harm, or
risk of harm, is created with respect to each customer defrauded. The number of mailings
would then bear a direct, logical relationship to the harm caused. If, however, with respect
to defrauding a customer out of $100 the defendant makes several mailings (the initial
solicitation, a follow-up solicitation, and a thank you designed to lull the customer into
inaction), it should be treated as a single scheme to defraud in which there were several
mailings. Similarly, a scheme to defraud an insurance company by mailing multiple false
claims should be treated as a single scheme, not as separate schemes to defraud.
178. See United States v. Davenport, 929 F.2d 1169, 1171 (7th Cir. 1991) (“The
government’s position [that each deposit equals a separate offense] leads to the weird result
that if a defendant receives $10,000 and splits it up into 100 deposits he is ten times guiltier
than a defendant who splits up the same amount into ten deposits.”).
179. See, e.g., United States v. Wall, 37 F.3d 1443, 1446 (10th Cir. 1994) (“Each [loan]
involved a separate movement of money, and each, standing alone, put the bank at risk of
loss.”). But see United States v. Heath, 970 F.2d 1397, 1402 (5th Cir. 1992) (“Although a
two-loan scheme may subject an institution to greater risk than a scheme involving only one
transaction, it is the execution of the scheme itself that subjects a defendant to criminal
liability, not, as we stated in Lemons, the execution of each step or transaction in furtherance
of the scheme.”).
180. Compare United States v. Helms, 897 F.2d 1293 (5th Cir. 1990) (charging
defendant with forty-one mail and wire fraud counts in connection with selling
distributorship in nonexistent business to 629 victims, defrauding them of more than $5
million), with United States v. Brown, 948 F.2d 1076 (8th Cir. 1991) (charging defendant
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Ultimately, the common-sense question is whether the defendant is more
criminally culpable because of each additional mailing.181
V. Conclusion
Over a century ago the Supreme Court held that each separate mailing
constituted a separate mail fraud offense. It premised this holding on its
understanding that abuse of the United States Mail was the “gist” of the
mail fraud statute. That premise no longer rings true. The history of the
mail fraud statute demonstrates that the government has slowly transformed
the original mail fraud statute from an act designed to protect the United
States Post-Office establishment from abuse to a catchall offense for
attacking any scheme to defraud, with the use of the United States mail or
commercial mail service acting as a jurisdictional basis only. It is clear that
at least since the 1994 amendment to the mail fraud statue, the “gist” of the
mail fraud statute is the execution of the “scheme or artifice to defraud.” If
the foundational premise of the Ex parte Henry holding has since eroded,
the rule that each mailing constitutes a separate offense sits on shaky
ground. To ensure fairness, the time has come for Congress to make clear
what is apparent. Each separate mailing made in connection with a scheme
and artifice to defraud should no longer constitute a separate mail fraud
offense.

with sixty mail and wire fraud counts in connection with making a fraudulent disability
claim for monthly benefits of $3511).
181. See Rakoff, supra note 15, at 778 (arguing that the number of mail fraud counts
should be related to such factors as “the scope or duration of the fraud, the number of
victims, the amount of damage, or any other factor relating to the moral culpability of the
perpetrator or the social damage inflicted by his fraud,” as opposed to “the sheer
happenstance of how many times the mails have been used in executing the fraud”).
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APPENDIX A
The following is a comparison of the original mail fraud statute and the
current version of the mail fraud statute. The deletions from the original
statute are struck out, and the added language is underlined:
That if any person Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell,
dispose of, loan, exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish
or procure for unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation,
security, or other article, or anything represented to be or intimate or held
out to be such counterfeit or spurious article to be effected by either
opening or intending to open correspondence or communication with any
other person (whether resident within or outside of the United States), by
means of the post-office establishment of the United States, or by inciting
such other person to open communication with the person so devising or
intending, shall, in and for executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting
to do so), places any letter or packet in any post-office of the United States
or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing whatever to
be delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives any therefrom, any such matter or thing person, so misusing the
post-office establishment or knowingly causes to be delivered by mail or
such carrier according to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it
is directed to be delivered by the person to whom it is addressed, any such
matter or thing, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished
with a fined of not more than five hundred dollars, with or without such
imprisonment, as the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar
months under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years or both.
The indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to
the number of three when committed within the same six calendar months;
but the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the
punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office
establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme or
devise. If the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit
authorized, transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in
connection with, a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as
those terms are defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster
Relief and Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122)), or affects a
financial institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000
or imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
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In other words, the only common statutory language that remains from
the original statute is: “. . . having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud . . . place . . ., or take . . . or receive . . .
therefrom, . . . such . . ., shall be fine[d] under this title or imprisoned not
more than twenty years or both.”

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol66/iss2/3

2014]

WHAT IS THE GIST OF THE MAIL FRAUD STATUTE?

325

APPENDIX B
The below annotated version of the statute readily exposes the alterations
between original mail fraud statute and the 1909 amended version of the
mail fraud statute.
That if any person Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any
scheme or artifice to defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means
of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises . . . .to be
effected by either opening or intending to open correspondence or
communication with any other person (whether resident within or outside of
the United States), by means of the post-office establishment of the United
States, or by inciting such other person to open communication with the
person so devising or intending, shall for the purpose of, in and for
executing such scheme or artifice (or attempting to do so), place or caused
to be placed, any letter or packet, postal card, package, writing, circular,
pamphlet, or advertisement whether addresses to any person residing
within or without the United States,
in any post-office, or station thereof, or street or other letter box of the
United States, or authorized depository for mail matter, to be sent or
delivered by the post-office establishment of the United States, or shall take
or receive any such therefrom, whether mailed within or without the United
States . ... such person, so misusing the post-office establishment, shall be
fined not more than one thousand dollars or imprisoned not more than five
years, or both guilty of a misdemeanor, and shall be punished with a fine of
not more than five hundred dollars, with or without such imprisonment, as
the court shall direct, not exceeding eighteen calendar months. The
indictment, information, or complaint may severally charge offenses to the
number of three when committed within the same six calendar months; but
the court thereupon shall give a single sentence, and shall proportion the
punishment especially to the degree in which the abuse of the post-office
establishment enters as an instrument into such fraudulent scheme or
devise.
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APPENDIX C
Amending the language of the mail fraud statute could be accomplished
by using the language “for the purpose of executing such a scheme” to
“executes such a scheme,” such that the language matches that of the bank
fraud statute. There would need to be other minor changes to take into
account the change in verb tense. The amendments to the mail fraud statute
are as follows (with additions underlined and deletions crossed out):
Whoever, having devised or intending to devise any scheme or artifice to
defraud, or for obtaining money or property by means of false or fraudulent
pretenses, representations, or promises, or to sell, dispose of, loan,
exchange, alter, give away, distribute, supply, or furnish or procure for
unlawful use any counterfeit or spurious coin, obligation, security, or other
article, or anything represented to be or intimated or held out to be such
counterfeit or spurious article, for the purpose of executing executes such
scheme or artifice or attemptsing so to do, places by placing in any post
office or authorized depository for mail matter, any matter or thing
whatever to be sent or delivered by the Postal Service, or deposits or causes
by depositing or causing to be deposited any matter or thing whatever to be
sent or delivered by any private or commercial interstate carrier, or takes or
receives by taking or receiving therefrom, any such matter or thing, or by
knowingly causes causing to be delivered by mail or such carrier according
to the direction thereon, or at the place at which it is directed to be delivered
by the person to whom it is addressed, any such matter or thing, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned not more than twenty years, or both. If
the violation occurs in relation to, or involving any benefit authorized,
transported, transmitted, transferred, disbursed, or paid in connection with,
a presidentially declared major disaster or emergency (as those terms are
defined in section 102 of the Robert T. Stafford Disaster Relief and
Emergency Assistance Act (42 U.S.C. § 5122)), or affects a financial
institution, such person shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or
imprisoned not more than 30 years, or both.
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